Historians often interpret American political thought in the early
Historians often interpret American political thought in the early twentieth century through an opposition between the technocratic power of expertise and the deliberative promise of democracy, respectively represented by Walter Lippmann and John Dewey. This article explores Lippmann's concurrent controversy with Lewis Terman about intelligence testing, in which Dewey also intervened. It argues that the Lippmann-Terman controversy dramatized and developed a range of ideas about the politics of expertise in a democracy, which centered on explaining how democratic citizens might engage with and control the authority of experts. It concludes by examining the controversy's influence on democratic theory.
In October 1922, the journalist Walter Lippmann intervened in a debate about democracy.
Expert psychologists employed by the U.S. Army during the First World War had measured the intelligence of over 1,700,000 soldiers, often using tests based on a revision of the BinetSimon intelligence scale developed by the Stanford professor Lewis Terman. 1 After the war, they claimed that the "average intelligence" of the white draft, "when transmuted… into terms of mental age," was "about 13 years (13.08)." 2 When transformed into a statistic about the average mental age of Americans, this claim generated an anxious debate about the very possibility of democracy in America. Lippmann contested it so prominently, and Terman
Because it did much to shape this understanding, the Lippmann-Terman controversy also contributes to broader debates about the authority of the social sciences in modern America. Historians have long quarreled about the institutional, ideological, and intellectual dynamics of social-scientific expertise in the United States, and especially about how these dynamics relate to the phenomenon of professionalization. 9 A more recent historiography, alongside the field of science and technology studies, has focused on the public reception of social science, and shown how professional experts engaged in diverse exchanges with nonprofessional audiences. 10 The Lippmann-Terman controversy is particularly productive in these contexts, for here historians have a moment when leading democratic theorists sought to influence "the publicity of knowledge" about some expertise that was widely perceived to imperil democracy. 11 Here, the intellectual culture of "scientific democracy" confronted the relationship between professional experts and democratic citizens as an urgent political problem. 12 And by exposing a range of practical and theoretical attempts to address this problem, the controversy shows how the authority of expertise in modern America once depended on unstable and ultimately rhetorical processes of democratic persuasion. This article, then, will first explore Lippmann's critique, then Dewey's intervention, and then Terman's response. It will conclude by considering both The Phantom Public and The Public and Its Problems in the context of the controversy.
I
The sensational statistic that the average mental age of Americans was about thirteen generated a cacophonous political debate in the early 1920s. For some scientists and publicists, such as the Anglo-American psychologist William McDougall, the army tests proved that genetic inheritance determined intelligence, which implied that most democratic citizens were biologically irredeemable. 13 The historian and white supremacist Lothrop Stoddard went further, and used the tests to make the case for a racially pure political order: "Neo-
Aristocracy."
14 Intelligence testing thus gave seemingly scientific support to explicitly antidemocratic arguments, which often involved eugenic ideas and nativist policies. 15 Always at stake in the debate as a whole was the scientific authority of psychological expertise, which psychologists had maintained through decades of public interventions and professional innovations that stressed their credibility as scientists. 16 Intelligence testers had a particular need to persuade diverse audiences that their expertise was scientific, for they sought to shape public policy, especially education policy, and so found both intellectual substance and between democracy and expertise. Dewey was more conscious than Lippmann that he was "not an expert in this field," and so sought advice from his daughter Evelyn, "who had worked practically on the tests for three years, and who also agreed. She made some suggestions which I have embodied…. so that the 'experts' might not come back and accuse Mr L of ignorance or misrepresentation." 66 Croly told Lippmann that Dewey's articles were "extremely valuable, and almost as badly written as they are valuable." 67 The New Republic printed them in the two issues following Lippmann's series.
"As Mr. Lippmann has so clearly shown in these pages," Dewey argued, the claim that the average mental age of Americans could be identified as about thirteen was "literally senseless." 68 Dewey already saw intelligence not as an innate construct but in terms of the relationship between individual habit and social environment, so he readily agreed with
Lippmann's argument that intelligence testing was not science and that the testers were not scientists. 69 But the tests did more than question Dewey's understanding of intelligence; they also troubled his broader account of the relationship between democracy and education. Dewey had long argued that "democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living," and had long seen education in "scientific method" as essential for this mode. 70 Moreover, his argument built on a distinctive philosophical system, which, by combining a naturalistic (anti-metaphysical) epistemology with a consequentialist (instrumental) ethics, saw science and democracy as mutually constitutive activities. 71 Dewey had always urged experts to educate broader publics by popularizing scientific knowledge, and attacked attempts to limit scientific education, such as William Jennings Bryan's contemporaneous campaign against teaching evolutionary biology in public schools. 72 But while Bryan's campaign represented a form of anti-scientific democracy, which could be combatted through better education about evolution, Terman's tests presented Dewey with a potentially more worrying proposition: anti-democratic science.
Beyond embracing Lippmann's argument that intelligence testing was unscientific, Dewey therefore explained its political implications through the education of the experts themselves. "There is no need to re-traverse the ground so admirably covered by Mr.
Lippmann," he wrote. "But why has it been so general assumed among our cultivated leaders that a purely classificatory formula gives information about individual intelligence in its individuality?" 73 This focus on "the acquired habits of intellectual spokesmen" rather than "the inherent intellectuality of the populace" made sense, for it meant that Dewey could attack the experts without conceding the possibility that their expertise might be true. Building on Lippmann's conclusion that the intelligence testers concealed an elitist will to power, Dewey Dewey's second article expanded on these individual capacities and their relationship to democracy. "It was once supposed, at least by some, that the purpose of education… was to discover and release individualized capacities," he wrote. Yet now, he added, "we welcome a 73 Dewey, "Mediocrity," 35. 74 Ibid., 36. 75 Dewey, "Public Opinion," 288. 76 Dewey, "Mediocrity," 37. "Democracy in this sense," he wrote, "denotes, one may say, aristocracy carried to its limit." 77 Dewey's argument that true democracy meant universal aristocracy challenged the whole distinction between professional experts and amateur citizens. In Dewey's democracy, "every human being as an individual may be the best for some particular purpose and hence be the most fitted to rule, to lead, in that specific respect." When fundamental general education had released each individual's individuality, there would be no distinction between "superior"
and "inferior" individuals, but rather an equality of superiorities. Because science would be the domain of everyone, and because deliberation would be continuous, all the citizens would in some respect be experts. "Democracy will not be democracy until education makes it its chief concern to release distinctive aptitudes in art, thought and companionship," Dewey reiterated. 
III
Colleagues reported that Terman "trembled with rage" after reading Lippmann's articles.
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Having led disciplinary efforts to define professional standards and influence public policy, 78 Ibid., 62-3. 79 psychologist against another," Terman wrote. "The trick is very simple; all you do is to take an isolated statement out of its original setting and quote it in a setting made to order. In that way you can have all the expert opinion on your side." Because Lippmann's criticism did depend on deploying scientists strategically to generate rhetorical authority, this had some bite. "Mr.
Bryan," Terman added, "is said to use this method with telling effect against the evolutionists."
Terman then warned that "when the outsider comes along" and tried to exploit legitimate disagreements among professional scientists, "it is well to be on one's guard. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it means that an unfair advantage is being taken both of the reader and of the author quoted." 85 Because amateurs like Lippmann or Bryan could manipulate their publics, what mattered politically was the protection of autonomous space for the professionals.
Terman's politics of expertise was therefore about removing politics from expertise. Science was for scientists, and democracy happened after or elsewhere.
In the context of Lippmann's claims about Galton and Cattell, however, Terman's argument depended on showing that all the experts agreed that intelligence was hereditary. And here Terman could only use his own rhetorical strategies to try to persuade public opinion that the science was on his side. "Think," he urged, "of Mr. Lippmann's quoting Cattell in support of his tirade against intelligence testing." The thought was ridiculous: "Cattell, the pupil of Galton, the father of mentality testing in America, the inventor of new methods for the study of individual differences, the author of important studies (in progress) on the inheritance of genius!" 86 Yet, striving for effect, Terman strained against both the history of intelligence testing and his own intellectual biography. For, substantively, Cattell had neither followed Galton nor fathered American intelligence testing. Rather, Cattell's early Comtean sympathies meant that Galton's statistical positivism would always have been attractive (especially after 85 Terman, "Great Conspiracy," 118-19. 86 Ibid.
training with Wilhelm Wundt). 87 And though Cattell's 1890 article on "Mental Tests and
Measurements" generated some enthusiasm among American psychologists, this was unsurprising in the broader context of the empirically-orientated "new psychology," and his influence had mostly died by 1900. 88 Terman knew and respected Cattell, but did not engage much with his work. 89 Indeed, Cattell told Terman that his response to Lippmann had exaggerated the scientific consensus about the hereditary nature of human intelligence. 90 "I am quite aware that you probably attribute somewhat less to native endowment than I do," Terman replied, "but I did not feel that Lippmann was justified in quoting you in a way to leave the impression that you attributed next to nothing to endowment." 91 Terman's own use of experts for effect thus reinforced Lippmann's position: amateur publics struggled to evaluate expertise in its own terms, but they could and would engage with the authority of experts in some terms. The political contest was over which terms, and here Terman sounded more like a polemicist promoting table-talk than a scientist probing the evidence, he struggled to achieve authority for his expertise. Lippmann could get away with ad hominem attacks, for journalism rewarded sharp sentences about the hidden interests of one's opponent. But scientific authority demanded a more measured manner, which stuck to substance of the arguments at stake.
Terman's decision to abandon this rhetoric generated especially acute anxieties among academics. "I think you make a mistake to adopt the sarcastic attitude," warned Howard
Warren, a Princeton psychologist. "That attitude still goes in politics and the drama, but I believe that scientists ought to eschew it even in replying to a Bryan." 94 From Chicago, the political scientist Charles Merriam likewise fretted "that there should be so much odium philosophicum in the discussion of a coldly scientific situation" in a letter to Robert Yerkes.
95
The controversy put Yerkes in a particularly difficult position, however, for he had both worked In an early account of what came to be known as "operationism" in psychology, Boring argued that intelligence was not an individually innate construct (like "mental age"), but an operationally observable concept. 105 Drawing an analogy with the concept of power in physics,
he claimed that intelligence testing tested intelligence as "the amount of work that can be done in a given time." And this, he pressed, collapsed Lippmann's contention that time limits undermined a unitary concept of intelligence, because if "intelligence is like power, this contention is not an argument. If these people have less power, they have to go up the hill on low gear and it takes them longer; that is all." 106 Boring did not mention Lippmann explicitly, 103 The paper even printed mock intelligence tests as advertisements "to test your capacity to be a subscriber to the The New Republic" (New 106 Boring, "Intelligence," 36.
but implicitly offered a more convincing response to him than Terman. Like Terman, Boring prized scientific autonomy and mostly thought that expertise was for experts. 107 But he made his case through epistemology, not irony, and he took care to sound scientific. "Only with more observation and less inference," Boring concluded, could more be said about intelligence. 108 Professional objections to Terman's public sarcasm did not harm his career, for he assumed the presidency of the American Psychological Association in 1923. In his presidential address, Terman confidently announced that intelligence testing had "broadened and intensified our incentives to research, enlarged the public support of our science, and attracted new hosts of workers to the psychological vineyard." 109 By the end of the 1920s, his scales for testing children in primary and secondary education had annual sales in the hundreds of thousands. 110 Also at this time, psychometric testing expanded into many other areas, including the scientific study of gifted children, the coerced sterilization of the "feebleminded" adults, the racialized restriction of immigration from particular nations, the internment of criminals, the detection of delinquency, the analysis of sexuality, and the administration of industry.
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By the late 1940s, Boring wrote, "there was so much testing and it was working well." 112 So when cognitive psychologists during the Cold War argued that testing personalities for authoritarian tendencies could enhance democracy, they were untroubled by an old controversy about measuring intelligence. 113 And when critics of intelligence testing in the 1970s sought to revive Lippmann for "an unfinished chapter in the history of psychology," the effort miscarried, for he had nothing new to add to the nature-nurture controversy. 114 And at a broader level, New Left critiques of psychological expertise had little room for Lippmann. Noam
Chomsky, for instance, became an influential critic of both behavioral psychology and
Lippmann's democratic theory as ideologies of technocratic elitism. 115 Lippmann continued to criticize intelligence testing as 1923 wore on, but became repetitive. He published another, shorter series of articles in the New Republic, which centered on the British psychologist Cyril Burt as "one of the great authorities" on intelligence testing, who had superior expertise to "the more breathless work of the better known American old Oxford tutor) waded in as "a man of science" to insist that experts had a duty to publish their opinion "no matter how distasteful it may be." 118 Lippmann replied to McDougall by restating the dilemma that Terman had dramatized: "when a man of science comes along, claims to speak as a biologist and a scientific psychologist, and offers doubtful political theories as scientific judgments, the protection of genuine scepticism is denied us." 119 Lippmann began making notes for another work of democratic theory in March 1923, just after finishing his controversy with Terman. 120 He completed a draft in August, which he soon titled
Live and Let Live. 121 The text went through several revisions before being published two years later as The Phantom Public (not least in terms of its title, which for a while was simply
Democracy).
122 It returned to the dilemma of democracy in the Great Society, and is usually read as a sequel to Public Opinion, shorter and starker in style, perhaps, but basically similar in substance. 123 Here, however, it will be suggested that important aspects of Lippmann's argument in The Phantom Public developed the themes of the intelligence testing controversy.
For this text did not make the case, as Public Opinion had done in the end, for integrating experts into the bureaucracy of the administrative state. Instead, Lippmann devoted much of
The Phantom Public to exploring the nature of democratic debate, and to asking how democratic publics might make political decisions about issues for which they lack expertise.
Indeed, the text can be read as a minimal but constructive account of how amateurs control experts through public controversies.
There are obvious resonances of Public Opinion in The Phantom Public, for both texts address connected questions and are products of the same sensibility. Lippmann still saw the omnicompetent citizen as an "unattainable ideal," despite, he now added, the claims of "Lothrop Stoddard and other revivalists" that such a figure could be bred. 124 The Phantom The Phantom Public did not claim that democracy could somehow consign politics to a general class of elite experts. Precisely because of the Great Society's complex variety, no such class existed. Different political problems involved different groups of "insiders" and "outsiders," depending on the interests and opinions involved, but Lippmann thought that those who saw "a congenital difference between the masterful few and the ignorant many" were "victims of a superficial analysis." 128 The pluralism of the Great Society was so deep, and the specialization of knowledge so great, that insiders with expertise in one area of modern democracy would always be amateur outsiders in others. "That is why," Lippmann argued, 125 Ibid., 18-19, 52-3. 126 Lippmann, " He did not think that these publics could generate the expertise necessary "to deal with the substance of a problem," but he did argue that "the ideal of public opinion is to align men during the crisis of a problem in such a way as to favor the action of those individuals who may be able to compose the crisis." 132 This "ideal" did not solve political problems through public reason, but it did provide a way for democratic publics to engage with and make judgments about those who claimed the authority to solve them. In an echo of the intelligence testing controversy, Lippmann argued that amateur citizens could not understand the technical content of expertise, but that they could and should control the experts. "They must judge externally," 129 Ibid., 150. "Their congenital excellence, if it exists," he continued, "reveals itself only in their own activity. The aristocratic theorists work from the fallacy of supposing that a sufficiently excellent square peg will also fit a round hole." 130 Ibid., 79. 131 Ibid., 54. 132 Ibid., 68.
he wrote, "and they can act only by supporting one of the interests directly involved."
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Moreover, their judgments depended on the external signs by which those who stood on the side of the public interest in a particular controversy could be perceived. "The power to discern those individuals," he stressed, "is the end of the effort to educate public opinion. The aim of research designed to facilitate public action is the discovery of clear signs by which these individuals may be discerned." 134 These signs were not stereotypes for manufacturing consent, but rhetorical representations to help ordinary citizens make political judgments about particular insiders, which further echoed Lippmann's earlier strategy for making psychological expertise accessible to amateurs. "The signs are relevant," he continued, "when they reveal by coarse, simple and objective tests which side in a controversy upholds a workable social rule, or which is attacking an unworkable rule, or which proposes a promising new rule." 135 Lippmann expanded on these social rules in the second half of The Phantom Public.
"The interest of the public," he wrote, "is not in the rules and contracts and customs themselves but in the maintenance of a régime of rule, contract and custom." This amounted to something like a system of democratic norms, "some system of rights and duties" that maintained the culture through which democracy functioned. 136 Public controversies represented breaches of this culture, which turned on intricate issues that most amateur outsiders could not understand, but which could also involve representational schemes through which external judgments about expert insiders might be made. To aid citizens in their navigation of these controversies, Lippmann also established various "tests" that could be applied in them. 137 For example, when someone contested a social rule while relying on the authority of someone else whose assent was lacking (or whose conformity was absent), the contested rule could be assumed to serve 133 Ibid., 103. 134 Ibid., 68. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., 105-6. 137 Ibid., 107-9.
their self-interest, and the public could proceed to choose another person to fix it. 138 Lippmann's tests tried to be specific, but also exposed gaps in his argument. He did not, for instance, detail the actual political procedures by which publics aligned themselves with particular insiders. Nor did he provide guidance on how to resolve social rules that were broken unjustly but without objection. Nor did he explain what to do if debate broke down and a minority found itself at the mercy of a tyrannical majority.
But The Phantom Public nonetheless argued that democracy was a political order in which amateur outsiders exerted controlling authority over expert insiders. Even as Lippmann chronicled the complexity of mass society, even as he emphasized the illusions of public opinion, and even as he detailed the deficiencies of the citizens, he also maintained that "the bystander's only recourse is to insist upon debate." 139 Through public controversies, a democratic citizen could constructively shape politics. "He will not be able, we may assume, to judge the merits of arguments," Lippmann reiterated. "But if he does insist upon full freedom of discussion, the advocates are very likely to expose one another. Open debate… will tend to betray the partisan and the advocate." 140 The Phantom Public, then, presented public controversies as the agonistic locus of democratic politics, where partisanship could be perceived, advocacy betrayed, social rules contested, and expertise eschewed or embraced.
Controversies were not deliberative spaces for rational discussion among all the citizens, but political arenas in which claims to authority competed for the attention and loyalty of particular publics through symbolic representations of the issues at stake. Through them, Lippmann argued that public opinion in its "highest ideal" would "defend those who are prepared to act on their reason against the interrupting force of those who merely assert their will." give the impression that Mr. Lippmann was permanently 'off' democracy," wrote Dewey in an admiring review of the text, "Mr. Lippmann's essay is in reality a statement of faith in a pruned and temperate democratic theory, and a presentation of methods by which a reasonable conception of democracy can be made to work, not absolutely, but at least better than 142 Ibid., 74.
democracy works under an exaggerated and undisciplined notion of the public and its powers." Problems agreed with Lippmann that this authority was inevitable in mass society, and also approved of attempts to make expertise democratic through public debates. "It is not necessary that the many should have the knowledge and skill to carry on the needed [expert] investigations," Dewey wrote; "what is required is that they have the ability to judge of the 149 Ibid., 209. Emphasis in original. 150 Ibid., 210-11. 151 Ibid., 208. Emphasis in original.
bearing of the knowledge supplied by others upon common concerns." 152 This, in fact, came close to articulating Lippmann's position on intelligence testing: democratic citizens did not have to understand the technical content of scientific expertise, but they did need to judge "the bearing of the knowledge" through discussion and persuasion. However, Dewey also held on to the hope that scientific education and public deliberation would one day make democracy expert. "Just as the specialized mind and knowledge of the past is embodied in implements, utensils, devices and technologies which those of a grade of intelligence which could not produce them can now intelligently use," he claimed, "so it will be when currents of public knowledge blow through social affairs." 153 Dewey concluded that only local community could realize true democracy. This conclusion involved the familiar difficulties of Dewey's politics, for he did not explain how to sustain such a community under modern conditions, and effectively abandoned the broader analysis of how the Great Society could become a Great Community. 154 "It is outside the scope of our discussion to look into the prospects of the reconstruction of face-to-face communities," he stated. 155 and it generated much anxiety among academics (Yerkes, Merriam, Warren). Yet here it did not seem possible for experts to isolate themselves from democracy, for mass society both generated and needed specialized knowledge and experts often intervened in politics. But nor was it plausible to put experts in charge of democracy, for their expertise could threaten democratic values and undermine democratic culture. Instead, the authority of amateurs over experts turned on the contested dynamics of the public controversies through which they engaged with each other politically. For Lippmann, these dynamics, with all their difficulties, ultimately meant that the politics of expertise had to make sense within, and neither resolve nor escape, the broader fact of democracy.
